Common Sense?
In discussion over an engaging post about altruism by Richard over at Pixnaps he introduced an interesting point about common sense.
Richard: It involves rejecting our common-sense understanding of human action, and implies that we are engaged in massive self-deception.
IM: Definitely, why would you suppose that common-sense understanding of the human mind in reference to how we act just happens to be the best and most accurate model.
All else being equal, it counts against a theory if it is counter-intuitive. Similarly if it implies that most of our beliefs are false, that we are engaged in massive self-deception, etc. This isn't a decisive objection, of course, but such uncharitibility does count against a theory. (The Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis can account for all the data, but we reject it because it implies that all our common-sense beliefs are false. Simple realism is an alternative theory that serves much better in this regard. I have two hands, and I have other-regarding desires. We prefer theories that don't contradict these core beliefs.) So the onus is on the theory's proponent to show there is some advantage which makes this cost worth bearing.
I think that it is probably right in one sense that the counter-intuitive nature of a theory counts against a thoery but that this is outweighed by explanatory power.
The reason we develop theories is to grant an understanding of reality. If one theory gives an account of reality that confirms our common-sense beliefs and intuitions then it is far more palatable than one that requires us to reject our previously held notions and assumptions about the world and ourselves.
The danger here however is that because of its palatability we may search for theories to confirm our preconceived notions and ideas and our perspective may therefore skew.
Our aim and intent should always be to seek out those theories which grant the most explanatory power’. What does this mean? Well take the following passage from Shakespeare’s Macbeth:
Macbeth: Out, out, brief candle! Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more. It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.
1. Now one interpretation could be that in this line Macbeth is describing an actor whose name is ‘Life’ and only had one hour playing a part upon the stage before loosing his voice forever.
2. Another is that it is referring to the fragility and absurdity of life, demonstrating Macbeth’s morose reaction to the news that Lady Macbeth has killed herself.
Now neither one of these interpretations/theories are any more valid than the other, they are both logical in the sense that they are semantically clear and follow from the original passage. What differs between them is their explanatory power, interpretation two is clearly far more powerful when considered in the context of the scene and the play and enables the reader to gain an intimate understanding of the character Macbeth. Interpretation two makes the reader why Macbeth would bring up such an irrelevant anecdote at a time like this.
Equally, Copernicus theory of the orbits of heavenly bodies in our galaxy granted far more explanatory power than the alternatives of his day even though it required people to suppose that they were victims of a massive self-deception at the hands of the Church who were convinced of the veracity of the account of Genesis.
The brain in the vat hypothesis may explain why some people appear to have advanced telekinetic capabilities but it disables us from understanding how we interact with reality and raises further questions of how we came to exist in vats. This is why we reject it, or at least this is why we should reject it.
Why should the counter-intuitive nature of a theory count against it? Not because of the effort involved in adjusting long-held intuitions, but because common sense holds a great deal of explanatory power.
I think that common sense intuitions are developed through an evolutionary biological manner. That if are brains are formed at the same time as our bodies it makes sense that we are intuitively attracted to features that happen to be indicators of health in our mates. It makes sense that we are intuitively fearful, or less empathetic with foreigners who look different from ourselves. It makes sense that we can easily conceive of the idea of ten things but not of a trillion things.
Along this view it would also make sense that our common sense grants us very simple ideas with great explanatory power but with no ability to discover the inner mechanics of reality that may link everything together. It makes sense that we are engaged in a massive self-deception because these intuitions are based upon the interface between an evolving primate and the world.
In this sense, I propose that counter-intuition does not detract from a theory at all. Whereas limited explanatory power and over-complexity does.
Labels: logic, philosophy, veritas
11 Comments:
I note that counter intuitive true theories and intuitive but false theories will remain under debate for a long time. "true and intuitive" theories and "false and counter intuitive" ones will be likely to come to resolution.
Thus the fact that almost everyone applies the "intuition" method of analysis means that when selecting between major alternative theories it may be the counter intuitive theory that is the better bet (of course this argument is not always applicable).
Puported by geniusNZ
I think you're running the risk of conflating *very* different kinds of "understanding" when you discuss understanding MacBeth and understanding heavenly phenomena in the same context. For example, natural laws arguably "link" the heavenly bodies together in their orbits, etc. But what, praytell, would the "hidden mechanism" be in the case of a fiction like MacBeth, and what would the hidden mechanism be "linking"?
As for your claim that counterintuitiveness doesn't count against a theory, well, the obvious response is: that's counterintuitive! ;)
Puported by John Turri
I think you're running the risk of conflating *very* different kinds of "understanding" when you discuss understanding MacBeth and understanding heavenly phenomena in the same context.Thanks for the comment John and I agree to an extent. I am pairing literary interpretation with empirical interpretation to demonstrate the value of explanatory power. Now of course this is not the only advantageous quality of a theory that should be sought after, the most important is predictability.
Now whilst predictability is of great value to astronomers, it is less so to literary theorists. We can’t ask Shakespeare to tell us what he meant, or to rewrite a variation to see if our theory still fits. All we can do is ask that it fits within the entirety of the work and this assumes that the author is good enough to be consistent, or does not utilise inconsistency as another device. So in the text, explanatory power I would argue is what matters most.
But what, praytell, would the "hidden mechanism" be in the case of a fiction like MacBeth, and what would the hidden mechanism be "linking"?If one were to take the first interpretation, what would be hidden is Macbeth’s rationalistic nature. That even in the grief of his wife’s death he uses Nihilism as a way of attenuating not only the significance of her death but his responsibility. If life is meaningless then so are the egregious crimes they committed. This links together the whole story and the theme of his character.
Puported by Illusive Mind
Interesting point geniusNZ, but are you suggesting that because most people select intuitive theories it is more likely that the counter-intuitive theory is “the better bet.”?
Puported by Illusive Mind
Do you really mean to say that if we had two theories of exactly equal explanatory power (and so forth), but one was common-sensical and the other struck us as entirely bizarre, you don't think we have any reason to prefer the first one?
I do think explanatory power is probably more important - especially for scientific theories, where our intuitions are notoriously unreliable - but that doesn't mean common-sense counts for nothing at all.
And what about philosophical theories (or 'conceptual analysis', or whatever you want to call it)? In some cases it seems the entire purpose of a theory is merely to systematize our intuitions. Consider ethics. If a moral theory suggested that torturing children for fun was morally right, then that would be definitive grounds for rejecting it. Whatever the theory is talking about, it's not what *we* mean by "ethics".
I wonder if we could generalize this, and say that a theory that's too counterintuitive runs the risk of "changing the subject". After all, explanations must appeal to concepts that we are familiar with, for how else are we to even understand them?
Puported by Richard
Now I dont think that you should just rush out and favour all counter intuitive theories since this logic relies upon a significant amount of analysis being done on the specific issue. So if one person thinks up and idea he should consider if it is intuitive BUT basically everyone does that automatically so I dont need to tell them to do it.
If a theory is counter intuitive and yet has existed for many years in the public debate there must be somthing more to it, either a bigger bias (intitiveness is to an extent the "sum of all biases" but individuals may have different biases) OR it is indeed true.
I think this is a significant effect in the area of academia that I studied so much so that one could bet on it (in fact I remember an academic artile from a cynic like myself saying somthing somewhat similar) - but maybe this is not true in all other fields.
Puported by geniusnz
> it is more likely that the counter-intuitive theory is “the better bet.”?
Sometimes this effect is dominant - at other times it may not be. I have a feeling that it is indeed true in my field. (once upon a time I had an academic article supporting that).
If you want an exact answer the key thing is how you define the possible theories and how you define intuitive.
Note this is only if those theories are proposed by others not if you thought them up yourself because ideas you thought up yourself will not be "intuitiveness filtered".
Puported by geniusnz
woops I thought the first one had not posted...
Puported by geniusnz
Do you really mean to say that if we had two theories of exactly equal explanatory power (and so forth), but one was common-sensical and the other struck us as entirely bizarre, you don't think we have any reason to prefer the first one?Very good question, a Buridan’s ass of intuition.
I’m think that the fact that we may have ideas about the world that are common to everybody doesn’t carry any weight by itself. So whilst we might be inclined to select theories that are intuitively appealing, there is no philosophically relevant reason to select a theory solely on the basis of common sense. Now this gets tricky because common sense overlaps ideas of simplicity and explanatory power, what we really need is a concrete example.
In some cases it seems the entire purpose of a theory is merely to systematize our intuitions. Consider ethics.
I think prescribing behaviour is different from empirical investigation. I also think that it if it is accurate that common sense is in of itself worthless, then so is a system of ethics that takes as its foundation our intuitions.
I wonder if we could generalize this, and say that a theory that's too counterintuitive runs the risk of "changing the subject". After all, explanations must appeal to concepts that we are familiar with, for how else are we to even understand them? I think you might be talking about two different things here. Say we are dealing with an area that is in of itself counter-intuitive (everyone’s favourite: certain aspects of quantum mechanics) it is likely that there are explanations within this field which themselves are completely counter-intuitive. This doesn’t mean we don’t understand them because it is using the same terminology and describing the things we (as learned scholars) are familiar with about quantum mechanics.
One physicist put it like this:
Once you go beyond the subatomic level, things get very strange. And it makes sense that they do, for why should the human mind be familiar with what it is like inside of a quark? That is not something a primate would ever encounter.
Puported by Illusive Mind
If a theory is counter intuitive and yet has existed for many years in the public debate there must be somthing more to it, either a bigger bias (intitiveness is to an extent the "sum of all biases" but individuals may have different biases) OR it is indeed true.Even though there could be many reasons why such theories have hung around, perhaps because of their controversial nature or die-hard supporters (Utilitarianism comes to mind) I think that long standing counter-intuitive theories do have something to them, although if they keep being accepted they won’t remain counter-intuitive.
Puported by Illusive Mind
I'm not sure "intuitiveness" is really a very guiid heuristic with which to judge scientific theories. There are a few reasons for this, and I'll try to touch on them without writing a book-length essay in your comments section.
1.) What is, and what isn't, intuitive is very malleable. What is intuitive for 20th century people in industrialized societies is likely to be quite different from what is intuitive for a 13th century person in any society, or a 21st person in a less developed or tribal society. This isn't to say that our intuitions are better, just different, because they are largely based on different sets of experiences.
2.) In most sciences, counterintuitive results are the most productive. This is in part because intuitions are just bad guides in general, but it's also because counterintuitive results open up regions of epistemic space that had been entirely unavailable before (consider one of the most counterintuitive paradigms in history, quantum mechanics). In fact, counterintuitive results often lead to strikingly new intuitions.
3.) Science will tend to procede away from our intuitions. While intuitions may be good starting points, science is, and has been since Aristotle, about getting at what's "underneath" (a fact that has opened it to criticism from some circles, e.g., phenomenology). What's underneath is quite often beyond the scope of our intuitions. Furthermore, as scientific paradigms become more complex, they will inevitably become more counterintuitive.
4.) Heidegger once noted that the most difficult thing to see is that which is closest to us. This makes intuitions particularly problematic for any scientific pursuit that has anything to do with us (especially the cognitive and social sciences). So much of what we know about ourselves and the behavior of others is built around assumptions and intuitions that have very little basis in empiricla reality. Instead, they come from cultural, linguistic, and other sources that are not designed to capture reality in the way that science is.
Puported by Chris
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